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  Auction experiments are commonly used to determine consumers’ willingness to pay for vari-
ous food items. While their non-hypothetical nature is a positive, market substitutes create a 
probable confounding of bids by field prices. This study examines the influence of field prices 
on bids for four foods in two versions by conducting auctions before and after large price in-
creases in 2007. Results show that bids were capped at given field prices and were signifi-
cantly higher in sessions conducted after store prices increased. Percentage premiums, how-
ever, were not significantly different across sessions, suggesting that effects of field prices 
could be reduced. Overall, researchers must be conscious of how field prices affect bids. 
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Experimental auctions have become common for 
determining consumers’ willingness to pay (WTP) 
for market and non-market goods. A large area of 
this research has involved eliciting consumer WTP 
for food products. Examples include research on 
genetically modified (GM) foods (Huffman et al. 
2007, Lusk et al. 2006, Bernard, Zhang, and Gif-
ford 2006), food safety issues and health informa-
tion (Marette, Roosen, and Blanchemanche 2008, 
Fox, Hayes, and Shogren 2002), and preferences 
for such foods as bison meat (Hobbs, Sanderson, 
and Haghiri 2006) and steaks (Feuz et al. 2004). 
Part of the popularity of this method stems from 
its non-hypothetical nature. Specifically, subjects 
that are the highest bidders end up purchasing the 
food at a real cost. Combined with the incentive-
compatible properties of the auction mechanisms 
used, this technique should do better at determin-
ing consumers’ WTP than contingent valuation 
surveys or other hypothetical techniques [for a 
comparison of techniques, see Lee and Hatcher 
(2001) or Lusk and Hudson (2004)]. 
  There are, however, limitations in the use of 
auction experiments. As noted by Alfnes and Rick-
ertsen (2007), products in the auction must be 
available for the auctions to be real.
1 While the 
products may not yet be on the market or are 
available only on a limited basis, the non-hypo-
thetical nature of auction experiments means that 
at least some close substitutes exist in the market-
place. Under standard consumer theory, it would 
be expected that changes in prices of substitute or 
complement goods outside the laboratory would 
influence consumers’ WTP and their bidding be-
havior. These changes could have profound ef-
fects on results and conclusions drawn that ex-
perimenters need to be conscious of. 
  A few past studies have considered the effects 
of market prices on bidding. Harrison, Harstad, 
and Rutström (2004) expressed concerns about 
the likelihood that bids in experiments would be 
                                                                                    
1 The alternative would be to use deception, which is uncommon in 
economic experiments. For a discussion of the issues involving decep-
tion, see Hertwig and Ortmann (2001). 
_________________________________________ 
John Bernard is Associate Professor and Na He is a graduate student in 
the Department of Food and Resource Economics at the University of 
Delaware in Newark, Delaware. 
This paper was presented as a selected paper at the workshop “The 
Use of Experimental Methods in Environmental, Natural Resource, 
and Agricultural Economics,” organized by the Northeastern Agricul-
tural and Resource Economics Association (NAREA) in Burlington, 
Vermont, June 9–10, 2009. The workshop received financial support 
from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the USDA Economic 
Research Service, and the Farm Foundation. The views expressed in 
this paper are the authors’ and do not necessarily represent the policies 
or views of the sponsoring agencies. 
The authors wish to thank Alexis Solano for help running the experi-
ments, participants at the NAREA workshop mentioned above, and 
three anonymous reviewers for their comments. This project was sup-
ported by the National Research Initiative of the Cooperative State Re-
search, Education and Extension Service, U.S. Department of Agricul-
ture (Grant No. 2003-35400-13812). 276    April 2010  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
censored by opportunities to purchase the good in 
the field. Cherry et al. (2004) tested to see if out-
side options influenced bidders using induced 
values. They found that subjects shaved their bids 
towards the price of the outside option provided. 
They expressed concerns regarding what may 
happen in private, homegrown value auctions if 
substitutes in the field were not accounted for. 
Corrigan and Rousu (2008) looked at some of 
these issues while testing to determine if field 
auctions in a supermarket are demand-revealing. 
They compared subject bids, divided into groups 
by purchase intentions, with their expectations of 
the field price. For those that intended purchase 
on that occasion, bids were not significantly dif-
ferent from their field price expectations. While 
not quantified in their article, Corrigan and Rou-
su’s graph made it appear that many intending 
purchasers bid over their price expectation. This 
may reflect lack of confidence on the part of those 
bidders regarding their expectations.
2 
  Other studies have included recommendations 
on how to deal with the field price influence. 
Lusk and Shogren (2007) presented a model of 
expected bid behavior in the situation where mar-
ket substitutes exist. Their conclusion was to not 
collect bids in their levels (referred to as the full 
bidding approach) due to possible upper censor-
ing of values, but rather to use an endowment ap-
proach.
3 Alfnes (2009) followed this work with a 
separate theoretical model. In his framework, for 
products that consumers would purchase outside 
the laboratory, the optimal bid was the field price. 
For other products, the bid should be lower. Im-
portantly, under the assumptions of his model, the 
differences in bids are equal to the differences in 
values, regardless of the market prices of substi-
tutes. He therefore defended the full bidding ap-
proach, as long as bids are not compared by their 
individual levels, despite the influence of field 
prices. 
  As a concern beyond these studies, the influ-
ence of field prices could be more problematic in 
times where market prices are volatile. Decreases 
in field prices could lower bids in an auction ex-
periment. Increased field prices could increase 
                                                                                    
2 Alternatively, some subjects may have wished to help the experi-
menter by giving a bid nearer their WTP regardless of the field price. 
To our knowledge, this is an open area for investigation. 
3 In the endowment approach, subjects are given one version of a 
product and asked for a bid to exchange it for another version. See 
Corrigan and Rousu (2006) for a critique. 
bids or, if the previous prices were at consumers’ 
WTP, bids could remain consistent. If the effects 
of these possible changes in bids are large, then a 
great deal of care must be taken to determine 
what researchers are learning from bids. This has 
become more important as food prices have re-
cently seen large increases and fluctuated sub-
stantially. Price changes were especially evident 
in 2007. Whole milk prices, for example, in-
creased 23.2 percent in the first 11 months of the 
year (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2007). That these 
changes were unusual was evident in the number 
of articles appearing in the popular press [see for 
example O’Donnell (2007)]. These conditions of-
fered an ideal opportunity to examine how bids 
are influenced by prices in the field. 
  The goals of this study were thus twofold. The 
first part was to determine whether or not field 
prices act as caps on subject bids in the labora-
tory. The second part was to see how bids from 
auction experiments changed in response to field 
price increases. As part of this study, a major sec-
ondary objective was to determine if analyzing 
bids directly or examining percentage premiums 
between different versions of products would be a 
better approach in such circumstances. These were 
investigated in auctions with four foods offered in 
conventional and organic versions. The foods 
were: milk, chicken breasts, chocolate chip cook-
ies, and tortilla chips. Experimental auction ses-
sions were run in both early and late 2007, with 
field prices for conventional milk and chicken 
breasts having increased substantially in the inter-
mittent period, and the prices of the other two 
products having remained constant. Subjects were 
given the conventional prices for each and asked 





A conceptual model was formulated generalizing 
from Harrison, Harstad, and Rutström (2004) and 
Lusk and Shogren (2007). To begin, consider a 
utility-maximizing subject with a value, V, for the 
good of interest in the experiment. Under Hick-
sian welfare theory, this value measures the amount 
of compensation necessary after a change in price 
or goods bundle that holds the consumer’s utility 
constant. In the static setting commonly assumed 
in auction experiments, this V could be consid-Bernard and He  Confounded by the Field: Bidding in Food Auctions When Field Prices Are Increasing   277 
 
 
ered the maximum a subject would be willing to 
pay if shopping for the product. Thus, by col-
lecting V from subjects the goal would be to esti-
mate the field demand curve for a good. 
  However, as discussed in Zhao and Kling (2001, 
2004), participants in an experiment may more 
appropriately be viewed as part of a dynamic 
market. In investigating these concerns, Corrigan 
(2005) obtained results leading him to suggest 
that outside markets must be carefully considered 
when conducting WTP auction experiments. Of 
interest here, when eliciting the value of private 
goods in an experimental auction, a subject usu-
ally has an option to purchase it outside the lab at 
some field price, P. When V is smaller than the 
sum of P and the transaction cost, T, associated 
with purchasing the good outside the lab, a sub-
ject is better off purchasing the product in the lab. 
In this case, it is optimal for a subject to submit a 
bid, B, equal to V so that the maximum WTP is 
elicited by the auction. However, if V is larger 
than the sum of T and P, a subject will be better 
off if he makes his purchase outside the lab. The 
maximum bid he would submit would be P+T. 
Therefore the researcher will be unable to capture 
V and it would not be possible to generate the 
field demand curve. 
  More specifically, assuming that the product 
offered in the lab and its field counterpart are 
perfect substitutes and that the field price does 
not affect the sale price in the lab, it could be ex-
pected that Bi = min [Vi, P + Ti] for each subject i. 
While the field and lab versions of a product are 
unlikely to be considered perfect substitutes, ei-
ther due to different brand preferences or the ba-
sic dynamics of the two purchasing opportunities, 
for simplicity consider that this relationship will 
hold within a narrow range. Note also here that 
the transaction costs would have a subjective 
value for each subject. For example, a subject 
planning to go to the grocery store after the ex-
periment would have a low T, while those view-
ing shopping for the item as a hassle should have 
a correspondingly higher T (Harrison, Harstad, 
and Rutström 2004). If a frictionless marketplace 
was assumed, T = 0, then it would be expected 
that a subject’s bid, B, would be min[V, P]. Thus, 
for cases where V > P, V cannot be determined 
although the value of T may allow for higher val-
ues of V to be observed. Therefore, the ability to 
get V from a rational subject depends on the field 
price and any transaction costs. 
  Next consider how an increase in the field price 
would alter bids and the ability to determine the 
field demand curve. Let P
1 be a new field price 
for the good such that P
1 > P. Now, Bi = min[Vi, 
P
1 + Ti]. There are two direct consequences of 
this. First, the mean bid will be the same or 
higher. It would be the same if Bi = Vi for all i 
under original price P. In other words, the field 
price was not a binding constraint on bidding. 
Arguably more likely, there would be subjects 
with P < Vi < P
1 whose values would be revealed 
in the new situation and lead to a higher mean bid 
observed in the laboratory. The second expecta-
tion would be that the variance of the bids would 
be higher or the same under the new price condi-
tion. The same variance would again represent 
the case where P was not a binding constraint on 
subject bids, since these subjects would have no 
rational reason to alter their bids. With any sub-
jects increasing their bids coupled with those 
staying at lower bid levels, the spread of the bids 
would be wider. 
  The situation would be similar in the case 
where field prices were not known. Consider 
subjects with only an imperfect knowledge of the 
field price, P. Subjects would consider an ex-
pected field price, E[P], in forming bids. Expec-
tations would depend on the subject such that in 
this situation Bi = min[Vi, Ei[P] + Ti]. Creating 
this expectation could be especially difficult for 
subjects in a time of fluctuating prices. The ex-
pectation of the field price would also depend on 
how close a substitute the good being auctioned is 
to the typical field alternative. Even for a good 
with a direct field substitute, if it is a lesser 
known niche product subjects would more likely 
use the known field price, P, of a more conven-
tional version on which to base their expectation. 
In this case, Ei[P] would be an increasing func-
tion of P. Therefore, if we consider again P and 
P
1 as the known price of the field substitute be-
fore and after a price increase, it would be ex-
pected that Ei[P] will be greater under P
1. Note 
that while this formulation allows bids to exceed 
P, it still imposes a cap that may take effect below 
V, the value researchers desire. As with the previ-
ous model it would not be possible to capture a 
full field demand curve in an experiment. The 
main expected difference would be the lack of a 
clear price cap point given subjects’ varying ex-





Two sets of auction sessions were conducted. The 
first set, consisting of six experiment sessions, 
was held in May of 2007. The second set, with 
two sessions, was conducted in November of that 
year. Each session had between 20 and 25 partici-
pants, for a total of 183 subjects (139 in the first 
set, 44 in the second set). Sessions lasted an hour 
and fifteen minutes. Subjects received $50, plus 
any extra earnings in practice rounds minus any 
food purchases. 
  A professional recruiter was used with instruc-
tions to create a sample representative of Dela-
ware, and to be consistent between the two sets of 
sessions. Demographic profiles of the two sets of 
sessions appear in Table 1, along with p-values 
testing the hypothesis that the samples were not 
significantly different. Subjects in the first set of 
sessions were significantly older, more highly 
educated, and had higher incomes. Previous simi-
lar research would suggest that this could lead to 
changes in the mean WTP, and must be con-
trolled for in the analysis (Bernard, Zhang, and 
Gifford 2006). No significant differences existed 
for gender or race. 
  Each session began with a questionnaire de-
signed to collect subjects’ incoming opinion and 
knowledge of the attributes of the foods in the 
auctions and their demographics. This was fol-
lowed by a detailed presentation of the auction 
mechanism, the Vickrey fifth-price auction, with 
examples illustrating the potential to miss out on 
profits by underbidding or to lose money by over-
bidding. Two practice auctions using induced 
values were conducted to be sure that subjects 
understood the mechanism and that misconcep-
tions were avoided (Plott and Zeiler 2005). 
  Once everyone understood the mechanism, four 
sets of food auctions were conducted. These were 
for 2-percent milk in the half-gallon size; one 
pound of boneless, skinless chicken breasts; a 16-
ounce package of chocolate chip cookies; and a 
14.5-ounce bag of tortilla chips. Each food was 
auctioned in four versions, with the focus here on 
conventional and organic.
4 Prices for the conven-
tional versions of each product were explained to 
                                                                                    
4 Other versions for milk were no antibiotics used and non-rBST; for 
chicken, no antibiotics used and free-range; for cookies, natural and 70 
percent organic; and for chips, natural and non-GM. 
subjects as being averages based on prices at mul-
tiple area markets within the previous two days. 
In the first sessions, these were $2.35 for milk, 
$3.99 for chicken, $3.99 for cookies, and $3.29 
for tortilla chips. For the second sessions the 
prices of milk and chicken were $2.77 (18 percent 
increase) and $5.49 (37.5 percent increase), re-
spectively. Prices of cookies and tortilla chips did 
not change. 
  Subjects were given some additional informa-
tion prior to the auctions. First, since the prices 
for conventional versions had been given, a short 
cheap talk style script was used impressing upon 
subjects to bid their WTP and not the store price. 
Second, it was announced that only one auction 
would be binding (e.g., organic milk). Following 
Bernard and Bernard (2009), the binding auction 
was randomly determined prior to each session 
with the result sealed in an envelope visible to the 
group. This design eliminated the waste of buying 
food products that would not be used, which was 
considered especially important given the perish-
able nature of some of the products. Third, sub-
jects were told that if milk or chicken was chosen 
as the binding auction, they were purchased that 
day and stored in an on-site refrigerator. Choco-
late chip cookies and tortilla chips were described 
as having been purchased within the previous two 
days. 
  A key aspect of the design was whether or not 
to provide the subjects with field prices for the 
food products. The role of reference prices from 
the field has been examined by Drichoutis, Laza-
ridis, and Nayga (2008). They ran two treatments 
of subjects: one was given field price information 
for various sandwiches, and one was not. Their 
results showed that the subjects given field prices 
had significantly higher bids. Here, knowledge of 
P was considered important, so subjects were 
given the field prices of the conventional versions 
of each food. However, to also determine what 
would happen in their absence, thus requiring sub-
jects to rely on E[P], field prices were not given 
for the organic versions.
5 It would be an open 
question if giving subjects conventional field 
prices but not giving them the organic field prices 
leads to smaller overall premiums. 
                                                                                    
5 Subjects might view conventional versions as substitutes for the 
organic ones and anchor their expectations of the price for organic off 
the given conventional field price. However, it was felt that enough un-
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Table 1. Demographics from the First and Second Sets of Sessions 
   Mean  H 0: Equal  Std. Dev. 
Variables  Definition  First Second  p-value First Second 
Age  Age of subject, in years  42.05  35.52  0.002
b 13.78  12.10 
Income  Subject income (in $ thousands)  69.28  57.74  0.096
b  44.97 33.76 
Education  1 if subject has less than high school, 2 if 
high school, 3 if some college, 4 if college, 
5 if post-college  
3.23 2.95  0.058
a  1.02 0.70 
Gender  1 if subject is male and 0 if subject is 
female 
0.44 0.47  0.33
b  0.50 0.51 
White  1 if subject is white and 0 if otherwise  0.73  0.74  0.46
b  0.45 0.45 
African 
American  
1 if subject is African American and 0 if 
otherwise 
0.18 0.24  0.21
b  0.39 0.43 
a p-values are from Fligner-Policello tests. 
b p-values are from Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests. 
 
 
  After the auctions, subjects completed a second 
questionnaire where they were asked to give their 
expected store price for the organic versions of 
each of the food products. While they completed 
this, a volunteer subject opened the envelope and 
announced the binding auction to the group. The 
reigning price for the binding auction and the five 
buyers were then determined. Lastly, subjects 
were paid, the food item was distributed, and the 
session ended. 
 
Methodology and Hypotheses 
 
Data from the experiments were analyzed both 
graphically and through statistical tests. In terms 
of graphics, figures were created for each of the 
eight foods showing the demand curves for the 
first sessions and the second sessions. These were 
constructed, following Lusk and Schroeder (2006), 
by plotting the sorted bids against the frequency 
of the sample with bids greater than particular 
prices. After calculating the cumulative percent-
ages at particular prices, the demand curves for 
the sample were produced by plotting both bids 
and cumulative percentages. 
  For statistical comparison of the bids, the first 
step was to determine their distribution so appro-
priate tests could be used. SAS software
6 was 
used to determine that all bid distributions were 
non-normal. In general, the common practice for 
                                                                                    
6 SAS OnlineDoc®9.1. 
comparing series of non-normal bids using the 
non-parametric Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test was 
followed. However, these comparisons are sensi-
tive to differences in the distributions of the se-
ries. Fagerland and Sandvik (2009) showed that 
even small differences in variances can have large 
effects on conclusions. Therefore, in addition to 
checking for normality, Brown and Forsythe tests 
for homogeneity of variances were conducted. 
When variances were found to differ, the Fligner-
Policello test, an alternative rank-based non-para-
metric technique, was used to compare means. 
For additional information, an examination of 
bids by the 25 percent, 50 percent, and 75 percent 
quantiles was conducted. Bids at the 50 percent 
quantile were compared using the non-parametric 
median test. 
  Comparisons were made to examine five hy-
potheses based on the research goals. 
HYPOTHESIS 1. Subjects would not bid above the 
given field prices for the conventional versions of 
the products in either set of sessions. 
  Given the conceptual model above it was ex-
pected that rational subjects with WTP above the 
field prices would enter bids at the field price. 
Those viewing the lab version of the good as an 
inferior substitute for the field version would be 
expected to bid less than the field price regard-
less. Only a small fraction would bid above field 
prices, dependent on their subjective values for 
transaction costs in the market. This was investi-280    April 2010  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
gated graphically and by determining the percent-
age of subjects that entered bids equal to or 
greater than the given field prices for the conven-
tional foods. An additional method to see how 
field prices could act as bidding caps was con-
ducted by determining the percentage of subjects 
in the second set of sessions that placed bids 
greater than the field prices from the first ses-
sions. It was assumed that a large percentage 
would bid above the earlier prices as the lower 
binding cap on bids was removed. 
HYPOTHESIS 2. The mean and variance of the bids 
for the conventional versions in the second set of 
sessions would be the same or higher for products 
that had price increases and the same for products 
with constant prices. 
  Based on the framework above, any rational 
consumer who found the lower field price cap-
ping his WTP would now bid up either to his 
WTP or to the cap of the higher field price. The 
existence of such subjects should lead to higher 
bid levels for the foods that had price increases, 
while bids for the other two products should have 
remained the same. As discussed, this increase in 
spread of rational bid values should increase the 
variance of the bids. 
HYPOTHESIS 3. The mean and variance of the bids 
for the organic versions in the second set of ses-
sions would be the same or higher for products 
that had conventional price increases and the same 
for products with constant conventional prices. 
  Even without subjects being given knowledge 
of the organic versions’ prices, it was expected 
that bids would increase for those foods with 
higher conventional prices. If subjects use their 
price expectation in a manner similar to that hy-
pothesized for field prices, then changes in bids 
similar to those under the first hypothesis should 
be expected for the organic versions. 
  The use of the known prices as anchors leads 
directly to the next hypothesis. 
HYPOTHESIS 4. Price expectations for the organic 
versions in the second set of sessions would be 
higher for products that had price increases and 
the same for products with constant prices. 
  The goal of the fourth hypothesis was to exam-
ine how subjects’ expectations of field prices 
changed for the organic versions of the foods 
between the two sets of sessions. It was hypothe-
sized that the higher conventional prices for milk 
and chicken in the second set would lead to 
higher price expectations for the organic versions; 
the price expectations for the other two foods 
would remain the same. 
HYPOTHESIS 5. The percentage premium that sub-
jects would pay for the organic version over the 
conventional version for each food would be con-
sistent across the sets of sessions for all products. 
  This hypothesis was related to the theory of 
Alfnes (2009), which showed that the differences 
in bids are equal to the differences in values, re-
gardless of the market prices of substitutes. The 
idea was that any confounding from field prices 
on auction data could depend on the way it was 
analyzed. While it may seem natural to examine 
bids in their level, depending on a study’s objec-
tives, bids could instead be compared by the dif-
ferences, or premiums, between them. Umberger 
and Feuz (2004) noted that looking at relative 
bids between products may be more valid than 
investigating bid levels. Note that using percent-
age premiums instead of just the premium was 
necessary to account for the higher prices in the 
second sessions. Lusk et al. (2005) showed the 
benefits, and necessity, of using percentages when 
examining bid data from various sources as part 
of their meta-analysis on GM foods. 
Results 
A graphical analysis of the first hypothesis—the 
demand curves for each set of sessions for the 
conventional versions of the products—appears 
in Figure 1. The figure provides evidence sup-
porting subject bids being capped at the given 
field prices. For the bottom panels depicting 
products where prices had not changed, bids in 
both sets of sessions were clearly bounded by the 
field price. In the upper panels for the products 
that had price increases, the influence of the higher 
field price in the second set of sessions was evi-
dent in the difference between the curves. In each 
case, there were only a few instances of bids be-
ing submitted above the respective field price. 
These results provide preliminary evidence re-
garding the second hypothesis that the mean and 
variances of the bids would be higher under the 
higher field price situation. While the few bids 




Figure 1. Demand Curves for the Conventional Versions of the Products by Session Set 
 
 
of transaction costs beyond the laboratory, the 
limit of the field price seemed to be generating a 
clear confounding effect on bids. Overall these 
matched well with the findings of Corrigan and 
Rousu (2008). As they found in their supermarket 
study, for the commonly purchased products used 
here, bids were often near the field price. 
  For additional detail on what was illustrated in 
the figure, the percentage of bids equal to or greater 
than the field prices for the conventional versions 
are displayed in Table 2. Across all foods and 
both sets of sessions the percentage of subjects 
bidding above the field prices for the conven-
tional versions was approximately 6.6 percent. The 
smallest percentage of subjects to bid over field 
prices was for tortilla chips.
7 In the first set of 
sessions more than a third of the subjects entered 
bids equal to the field price. In the second set of 
                                                                                    
7 Anecdotally, several subjects had remarked that tortilla chips are 
commonly available for sale below their stated field price. The effect 
of expectations of sales for products on WTP and bidding is another 
open avenue for investigation. 
sessions a smaller group, around one-fifth of par-
ticipants, entered bids equal to the given prices. 
Across both sets of sessions the remaining sub-
jects bid less than the given field price. If this 
were a market situation, under the theory of Cor-
rigan and Rousu (2008) those bidding at the field 
price would be viewed as likely purchasers, while 
those bidding less would not likely want to pur-
chase. 
  As additional positive evidence for the first 
hypothesis, Table 2 also contains the percentage 
of subjects in the second set of sessions that bid 
greater than the field price from the first sessions 
for the foods that experienced price changes. 
These showed a majority of subjects bidding well 
above the earlier prices. Specifically, for milk, 60 
percent of the subjects submitted bids greater than 
the previous field price, while for chicken the 
percentage was 76 percent. This again implies 
that the field price was generating a cap on bids 
as suggested by the above studies. 
  Results comparing the mean and variances of 
bids between the sets of sessions for the second 282    April 2010  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
Table 2. Percentage of Bids Equal or Greater Than Field Price Across Sessions 
   Percentage of Bids 
Sessions Food  Equal  Greater 
Percent Greater 
Than First Set FP 
First Set  Milk  38.35%  9.02%   
 Chicken 45.86%  11.28%   
 Cookies 35.34%  6.02%   
 Tortilla  chips  37.59%  3.01%   
Second Set  Milk  21.43%  7.14%  59.52% 
 Chicken 21.43%  7.14%  76.19% 
 Cookies 19.05%  7.14%   
   Tortilla chips  19.05%  2.38%    
 
 
hypothesis appear in Table 3. The variances of 
the bids for the conventional versions conformed 
to expectations. Specifically, variances were sig-
nificantly greater in the second set of sessions for 
products that had field price increases and not for 
those with constant prices. Turning to the mean 
bids for the conventional versions, it was found 
that these were also consistent with the hypothe-
sis, with bids significantly higher for the two 
foods that had experienced price increases. Bids 
for milk increased approximately 3 percent, which, 
while significant, was noticeably less than the 
store price increase (18 percent). Bids for chicken 
increased 25 percent, which was closer to the ac-
tual store price increase (37.5 percent). The larger 
increase of bids for chicken than for milk may not 
only be due to the larger percentage price in-
crease. According to the left-digit effect, a price 
change where the leftmost digit of the price re-
mains the same is perceived to be less meaningful 
than even an equivalent price change where the 
leftmost digit changes (Monroe 1979, Thomas 
and Morwitz 2005). Since both the milk prices 
began with 2, the overall effect on subjects from 
the price change might have been somewhat 
minimized. Together these still provided statisti-
cal validation of what was seen in Figure 1, that 
the values obtained from bids were being con-
founded by prices in the field.
8 
                                                                                    
8 Another possibility for higher bidding was higher seasonal demand. 
However, while there is some seasonality in milk sales, USDA (2009a) 
data over the past five years show sales in May and November to be 
similar, with the former tending to be slightly higher. For chicken, 
USDA (2009b) numbers show lower consumption in November as sales 
of turkey increase. 
  Another consideration across the two sets of 
sessions was the differences in their demographic 
makeup. It was believed this could account for 
unexpected differences, such as the significant 
decrease in bids in the second set of sessions for 
tortilla chips despite the constant field price. It 
was also important to check that the expected 
findings above were not due to changed demo-
graphics. To test this, a tobit model was con-
structed using the demographics in Table 1 with 
the parameter estimates used to predict how sub-
jects in the second set of sessions would have bid 
given the initial prices. The predicted mean bids, 
displayed in Table 3, were very similar to mean 
bids from the first set of sessions. This suggested 
that the decrease in the mean bid for tortilla chips 
was due to demographic differences and strength-
ened the other results. 
  Also included in Table 3 were the bid medians 
and the 25 percent and 75 percent quantiles. Ex-
amining these for the conventional versions fur-
ther showed differences between bidding for the 
increasing and constant priced foods. Medians 
were significantly different only for chicken. The 
median and 75 percent quantiles for tortilla chips 
were very close between the sets of sessions, sug-
gesting that the difference in the means was due 
more to the lower bids in the 25 percent quantile 
than to a different upper bid limit. This was even 
more evident for cookies, where the 75 percent 
quantile was identical across the sets. 
  Moving to the analysis of the two hypotheses 
dealing with the organic versions, the demand 
curves are first presented in Figure 2. Of the four 
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Figure 2. Demand Curves for the Organic Versions of the Products by Session Set 
 
 
interesting. For almost the entire price range, the 
demand was higher in the second set of sessions 
where the corresponding field price for conven-
tional was higher. This suggested that subjects 
used an anchoring technique, as considered in the 
conceptual model, from the conventional price to 
judge an appropriate bid price for the organic ver-
sion. This fit well with the findings of Cherry et 
al. (2004) that rational bidders would consider 
prices of other options when formulating bids. It 
also conforms to the theory of Alfnes (2009) that 
bids for products with the same field alternatives 
should change equally when prices of those alter-
natives change. Similar changes in milk demand 
were not apparent, perhaps reflecting the smaller 
percentage increase in the conventional field 
price or, again, the left-digit effect. 
  Also noticeable from Figures 1 and 2 was a 
tendency for the demand curves to be lower in the 
second set of sessions over the lowest price 
ranges. Since these price levels were below field 
prices, it suggested that more subjects had lower 
actual valuations in the second set of sessions for 
some products. In other words, the potential field 
price censoring did not apply to these subjects’ 
bids. This could be reflective of the differences in 
the demographic makeup of the two sets of ses-
sions and the concerns that subjects in the latter 
sessions bid lower overall. At higher price levels, 
where censoring of bids would be expected, the 
demand curves were very similar between the two 
sets of sessions for the constant price foods. 
 The third hypothesis was examined more 
closely using results for the organic versions pre-
sented in Table 3. Findings here were mixed. On 
the positive side, for chicken the mean and vari-
ance were significantly higher in the second set of 
sessions, as hypothesized. For milk, while the 
means were not significantly different and the 75 
percent quantile was almost the same, the median 
and variance in the second set of sessions were 
significantly higher. It thus appears that enough 
mid-value subjects bid higher when the conven-
tional field price was higher. More on the nega-
tive side, the tendency for lower bids in general in 
the second set of sessions, noted with the demand Bernard and He  Confounded by the Field: Bidding in Food Auctions When Field Prices Are Increasing   285 
 
 
curves, was further seen with the rest of the or-
ganic bid comparisons. However, looking again 
at the predicted means for the second sessions it 
should be noted that, while still lower, these were 
much closer to those from the first sessions. It is 
thus believed that the heterogeneity between the 
subject pools was responsible, and further exami-
nation of this hypothesis may be worthwhile. 
  Table 4 provides evidence of how known field 
prices may influence expected field prices for 
substitute versions, testing the fourth hypothesis. 
These results from the survey data were as hy-
pothesized, with expected organic milk prices up 
6 percent and expected chicken prices up 36 per-
cent in the second set of sessions, both significant 
at the 5 percent level. Interestingly, the increase 
in expected organic chicken price was very close 
to the 37.5 percent increase in the conventional 
price. While there were no significant differences 
in the other two expected organic prices at the 5 
percent level, both showed unexpected decreases, 
with those for cookies being significant at the 10 
percent level. Since these should not be influ-
enced by subject values, it would be hard to con-
sider demographic differences the cause. More 
examination here may also be warranted. 
  The remaining concern was to examine Hy-
pothesis 5 and see what effect field prices may 
have on an analysis based on percentage premi-
ums. These results are reported in Table 5. As is 
apparent, none of the percentage premiums for 
the organic versions were significantly different 
between the two sets of sessions for any food. 
This evidence conformed to Alfnes (2009), and 
demonstrated that the full bidding approach could 
still be considered as long as differences are the 
focus rather than bid levels. Using percentage 
premiums to analyze bid data could at least par-
tially offset the confounding aspects of price 
changes in the field. This approach would thus be 
recommended over examining bid levels as long 




Auction experiments are often used to gauge con-
sumers’ WTP for various products. One of their 
main advantages is their non-hypothetical nature. 
By this it is meant that subject bids have real con-
sequences in that high bidders will actually pur-
chase the product of interest for real money. The 
focus of this research, however, was to examine if 
this aspect could lead to difficulties in terms of 
gaining subjects’ WTP. The concern was that the 
existence of a product meant that it, or a close 
substitute, was available in the marketplace at a 
price subjects may know. Under consumer the-
ory, the knowledge, or even approximation, of 
this field price would confound bidding in auc-
tion experiments to the detriment of gaining con-
sumer WTP. 
  Results showed that subject bids in auctions for 
products that have market substitutes were con-
founded by the pricing situation in the field. This 
was especially apparent when subjects were pro-
vided with field prices, but was also evident when 
they were bidding based on their own price ex-
pectations. This finding is both good news and 
bad news for researchers. On the positive side, it 
demonstrates that subjects in experiments follow 
the expectations of standard consumer theory. If 
anything else were the case, there would be con-
cern over the appropriateness of the method over-
all. From a negative viewpoint, however, it showed 
that it is not possible to derive the field demand 
curve for a product within the laboratory. These 
concerns show that researchers must be careful 
about the way they collect, examine, and interpret 
data in auction experiments. While debate will 
continue between the full bidding and endowment 
approach, it is clear that analyzing the former 
with bids at their level is inappropriate. 
  More positively for auctions, and the full bid-
ding approach, was that examining the percent 
price premium subjects were willing to pay ap-
peared to be a promising alternative even across 
times of field price changes. For the food prod-
ucts studied here, the percentage premiums were 
invariant to changing field prices. In this sense, 
results back Umberger and Feuz’s (2004) asser-
tion that auctions are strongest at determining 
relative consumer values. They also suggest that 
Alfnes (2009) was correct in his support of the 
full bidding approach when differences are ana-
lyzed. These findings should be important to con-
sider in the design and analysis of similar auction 
experiments where consumer values are of con-
cern. 
  In general, the use of auctions in food studies 
remains new enough that further consideration of 
both its strengths and weaknesses is necessary. 
These findings show there are potential weak-
nesses to the auction experiment approach to de-
termining consumer WTP. In this regard, the 286    April 2010  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
Table 4. Comparison of Organic Price Expectations between Sets of Sessions 
  Mean of Session 
Food First  Second 
H 0: Equal 
p-value
a 
Milk (2%)  3.220  3.417  0.0134 
Chicken breasts  4.517  6.142  0.0001 
Chocolate chip cookies  4.079  3.847  0.0600 
Tortilla chips  3.604  3.440  0.1300 
a p-values are from Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests. 
 
 
Table 5. Comparison of Percent Premiums Organic over Conventional 
  Mean of Session 
Food First  Second 
H 0: Equal 
p-value
a 
Milk (2%)  21.52% 17.42%  0.2147
b 
Chicken breasts  14.80% 20.46%  0.3197
a 
Chocolate chip cookies  19.25% 11.98%  0.1081
a 
Tortilla chips  17.79% 16.22%  0.2996
a 
a p-values are from Fligner-Policello tests. 




technique is no different from methods that may 
be prone to hypothetical bias or other problems. 
For the case of field prices, more research may be 
needed to fully understand the issue or to devise 
methods to limit its effect. As a final note, it should 
be mentioned that many auctions are conducted in 
the field. These experiments, described in Harri-
son and List (2004), leave the control of the labo-
ratory for the potential benefits of running an auc-
tion in a market setting where the field is not just 
a confounding element but an aspect of the 
design. The results here though demonstrate that 
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